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THE DOCTRINE OF WAIVER AND CONSENT SEARCHES
I. Introduction
In May 1973 the United States Supreme Court, in Schneckloth v. Bust-
amonte,1 held that the police need not advise an individual who is not in custody
that he has a constitutional right to refuse to consent to a search of his property.
Although the conceptual ramifications of the decision are complex, the factual
background of the case is rather simple. At 2:40 in the morning a car containing
Robert Bustamonte and five other men was stopped by a policeman in Sunny-
vale, California, for being driven with the license plate light and one headlight
burned out. When the policeman routinely asked for a driver's license, the driver
was unable to furnish one; only one of the six, Joe Alcala, was able to comply
with the request. After all six had stepped out of the car and following the arrival
of two additional officers, a request was made to search the auto. Admittedly the
requesting officer had no probable cause and in the absence of consent a search
could not legally be conducted. Mr. Alcala, claiming the car belonged to a
brother, agreed to the search and even opened the trunk for the officer. There
was no evidence indicating that Alcaia knew he had a constitutional right to
refuse consent. Upon inspecting the trunk, the officer found three stolen checks
wadded up under the rear seat. The respondent in Schneckloth was ultimately
convicted for possessing a check with intent to defraud. He unsuccessfully chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the search in California courts and thereafter
unsuccessfully sought a writ of habeus corpus in a federal district court. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit the decision was reversed
and remanded.2 The Court of Appeals reasoned that the consent operated as a
waiver of Bustamonte's fourth and fourteenth amendment rights and, therefore,
demanded an examination of whether it had been given with full understanding
of the right to refuse. It further held that a mere verbal expression of assent com-
bined with the absence of coercion was not sufficient to justify finding a valid
consent.'
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held:
[W]hen the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to
justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact volun-
tarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, direct or implied.
Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined -from all the circum-
stances, and while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to
be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such
knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent. 4
In so holding, the Court rejected the application of the doctrine of waiver estab-
1 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
2 Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1971).
3 Id. at 700-01.
4 412 U.S. at 248-49.
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lished in Johnson v. Zerbst to the consent search situation and indeed to the
fourth amendment itself. That doctrine demands that in order for the relinquish-
ment or waiver of a constitutional right to be valid it must be proven that the
individual giving up the right knew of its existence and realized the consequences
of the waiver. In the words of the Johnson Court, "waiver is ordinarily an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." 6
Since the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizonda applied this definitional stan-
dard by requiring advisement of constitutional rights, many commentators had
argued' and some courts had held' that the same approach should be applied
to the consent search. Despite the persuasiveness of this suggested approach, the
Supreme Court rejected it in the Schneckloth decision, noting that to do other-
wise would seriously hamper effective law enforcement;" ° the decision demanded
only that a consent must be voluntary as determined by the totality of the cir-
cumstances.
This note will first briefly examine the use of the doctrine of waiver since its
creation in Johnson and then focus on its constitutional basis and the discrete
requirements of knowledge and voluntariness. This will be done in order to
provide the reader with a historical and conceptual perspective from which to
view the decision in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. The Schneckloth case will be
analyzed in detail along with the potential application of the waiver doctrine to
a variation of the Schneckloth fact pattern-a search consented to by one in
custody. It should be emphasized that this note deals with the doctrine of waiver
only as it applies in criminal litigation.
II. The Supreme Court and the Doctrine of Waiver
In instances where the Supreme Court has analyzed the validity of a waiver
of a constitutional right, it has consistently recognized a rebuttable presumption
against valid waiver. It has demanded that a court must "indulge every reason-
able presumption against waiver."11 Mere acquiescence in the loss of a funda-
mental right will not be presumed;12 moreover, no court may find a valid waiver
if the record is silent on the issue. 3 The basic philosophy underlying this alloca-
tion of the burden of proof to the prosecution is based on the assumption that it
would be almost impossible for an accused to prove that a constitutionally valid
waiver had not taken place. 4 This strong presumption has been relaxed only in
5 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The specific holding of the case, that valid waiver of counsel
was to be determined by viewing the totality of the circumstances, was, of course, overruled by
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6 304 U.S. at 646 (dictum) (emphasis added).
7 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8 See Note, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal After Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L.
Rav. 130 (1967); Note, Consent Search: Waiuer of Fourth Amendment Rights, 12 St.L. U.
L.J. 297 (1968); Tigar, Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel,
84 HAuv. L. REv. 1 '(1970).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966). and United States
v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
10 412 U.S. at 229.
11 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937).
12 Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937).
13 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
14 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 286 (1973) '(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the context of a waiver of the right to a speedy trial. In the case of Barker v.
WMigo 5 the Court shifted the burden of proof requirements so that, to some
extent, the accused was now called to share in the burden 6 because of the char-
acter of the right itself.
The Court, however, has placed much greater emphasis on the requirement
that the relinquishment, or waiver, of a right must fulfill the definitional stan-
dards of Johnson v. Zerbst-that it be knowing and intelligent. The Court has
been inconsistent in dealing with the problem of determining how knowledge of
the right is to be ascertained and to what extent, and in what degree, an under-
standing of the consequences of waiver is to be demanded and determined1
More recently, the Court has begun to recognize a third requirement-that a
waiver be not only knowledgeable and intelligent but also voluntary, that is,
the product of an uncoerced free will.'" These concepts have been periodically
intermingled; often the analysis of one has given meaning to the other.19 The
net effect has been a confusing array of case law; much of this uncertainty stems
from the constitutional basis of the waiver doctrine itself.
A. The Constitutional Basis
When the Supreme Court enunciated what was to become the doctrine of
waiver in Johnson v. Zerbst, it did not explicitly base its reasoning on any con-
stitutional theory.2" The language it used was broad and all-encompassing. Jus-
tice Black, speaking for the majority, implicitly appeared to be saying that the
doctrine was constitutionally mandated-the very grant of a constitutional right
demanded as a corollary that it be given up only under carefully circumscribed
conditions. Some legal scholars tended to view it in this manner." Such an
approach received support from the language of the Court in Miranda v.
Arizona.2 There the Court spoke in terms of reasserting the "high standards of
proof for the waiver of constitutional rights,"2 and noted that only after the
now famous warnings had been given could a suspect "knowingly and interi-
15 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
16 The Court characterized this as a "balancing test, in which the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defendant is weighed." Id. at 530. The test involved the balancing of
four suggested factors: ". . . length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion
of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant." Id.
It should be emphasized that the Court premised its holding on the finding that the
speedy trial right is "generically different from any of the other rights enshrined in the Con-
stitution for the protection of the accused." Id. at 519. The Court stressed several factors:
deprivation of the right may be to the advantage of the accused, and thus would "not per se
prejudice the accused's ability to defend himseIf"; and the nature of the right is much more
vague than other procedural rights in that it is "impossible to determine with precision when
the right has been denied." Id. at 519-21.
17 See text accompanying notes 29 through 41 infra.
18 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 '(1970); see also McCarthy v. United States, 994
U.S. 459 (1969).
19 See, e.g., McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969). There the Court observed:
... because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge,
it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in
relation to the facts!" Id. at 466 (emphasis added).
20 304 U.S. at 464.
21 See note 8 supra.
22 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
23 Id. at 475.
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gently waive" his rights.24 Such measures were required because of the "funda-
mental"25 nature of the right involved.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that if a general waiver stan-
dard for fundamental rights was indeed originally intended, the application of
Johnson suggests an alternative constitutional basis. The requirement is simply
part of the gloss of the fourteenth amendment due process clause left over from
the selective incorporation of various protections of the Bill of Rights. Such a
basis would permit application of the Johnson formula in varying degrees to
specific rights after analysis of the inherent requirements of each. This is in fact
what the Court has done26 although its analysis is open to criticism. A careful
reading of the Court's opinion in Miranda lends support to this interpretation
for it does not assert as broad an application of the Johnson formula as the "corol-
lary" argument suggests."
Implicitly recognizing this as the constitutional basis of the waiver doctrine,
the Court has proceeded to establish differing standards for analysis of waiver
of different constitutional rights. The path which it has blazed is not very con-
sistent, as the subsequent analysis will make clear.
B. The Requirement of a Knowing Waiver
Although prior to Schneckloth the Court had been generally consistent in
demanding that an individual know of a right before he gives it up,28 it has not
been so consistent in its use of standards for determining the existence of such
knowledge. At times the Court has evaluated the "totality of the circumstances"
24 Id. at 479.
25 Id. at 468. In dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan characterized this as "voluntariness with a
vengeance." Id. at 505.
26 See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
27 In Miranda, the Court explicitly recognized that any "statement given freely and volun-
tarily without any compelling influence is, of course, admissible in evidence." 384 U.S. at 478.
It additionally noted:
There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and
states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer
a confession or any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of
any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not
affected by our holding today.
Id. This was a frank recognition that the police and the prosecution were not to be saddled
with an impossible burden in dealing with a situation they had not initiated. It was also a
frank recognition that in noncoercive circumstances, waiver of the right to remain silent need
not be accompanied by an informed understanding of the right; the waiver need only be
voluntary.
28 But see note 27 supra, and Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951). In Rogers
the petitioner was found to have waived her privilege against self-incrimination in a grand
jury proceeding when, without knowledge of the privilege or advice of counsel, she had freely
answered some questions on a given criminating fact. The Court observed:
Requiring full disclosure of details after a witness freely testifies as to a criminating
fact does not rest upon a further "waiver" of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Admittedly, petitioner had already "waived" her privilege of silence when she freely
answered criminating questions relating to her connection with the Communist Party.
Id. at 374. The continued vitality of this position is, however, open to doubt. See generally
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 476 n.45.
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surrounding the alleged waiver.2 " At other times it has focused only on the
conduct of the accused in the belief that a given course of conduct might indicate
knowledge.
30
In guilty plea cases, where an accused waives the privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination,2" the right to a jury trial,"2 the right to confront one's
accusers,"3 and the right to contest the admissibility of the prosecution's evidence, 4
the Court has been more exacting. It has applied a dual standard: the trial
court judge must conduct an on-the-record inquiry to determine the nature of
the defendant's waiver, 5 and the accused must be represented by competent
counsel.3"
The most stringent and objective approach taken by the Court is in the
context of waiver of the right to remain silent arising from custodial interrogation.
In Miranda v. Arizona the Court demanded that an accused be informed of
this right as well as right to counsel. It observed:
[A]ssessments of the knowledge the defendent possessed, based on infor-
mation as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authori-
ties, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact. More
important, whatever the background of the person interrogated, a warning
at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures
and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at
that point in time.sr
The Court has never been terribly demanding in requiring that an accused
fully understand the legal consequences of relinquishing a given constitutional
29 This was the test originally adopted by the Court in Johnson. There the Court
held that the determination of knowledgeable waiver "must depend, in each case, upon the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experi-
ence, and conduct of the accused." 304 U.S. at 464.
30 See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), and the statement of Justice Black, dis-
senting, in Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. at 377. In Allen the Court was faced with the
difficult question of what to do with boisterous and unruly defendants in a criminal trial. The
Court held:
[WMe explicitly hold today that a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial
if, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues
his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner
so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be
carried on with him in the courtroom.
397 U.S. at 343. The Court went on to note that a defendant could regain his constitutional
right by agreeing to conduct himself in a civilized manner. Id. Professor Tigar has condemned
this decision as turning waiver into a "punitive sanction." Tigar, supra note 8, at 11.
The Court recently had an opportunity to re-examine the standards for having con-
duct amount to a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to be present at trial. However,
the Court backed down from this issue by holding that it had improvidently granted certiorari.
Tacon v. Arizona, 410 U.S. 351, 352 '(1973).
31 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
32 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
33 See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
34 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 766 (1970). For greater elaboration on the
procedural rights thus waived, see Tigar, supra note 8, at 20. This waiver is premised on the
fact that a guilty plea "represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in
the criminal process." Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).
35 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238
(1969).
36 See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
37 384 U.S. at 469.
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right. According to Miranda, a person must be warned that any statement made
by him after waiver of the right to remain silent and have counsel present can and
will be used against him at trial. This certainly does not inform him of al the
possible ramifications of a decision to forego the rights.3 8 In the guilty plea
context the Court has relied almost exclusively on counsel to provide an accused
with an understanding of the consequences of his waiver. 9 This is perhaps true
because of the complexity of the legal ramifications of a guilty plea. The Court
will assume a valid waiver if it was made upon advice "within the range of com-
petence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,"4 and provided that the ac-
cused was not "incompetent or otherwise not in control of his mental faculties."'
Beyond such a de minimis standard the Court would not go. Thus, in the guilty
plea context the knowledge of the defendant is coextensive with the presence and
advice of competent counsel."
To summarize: courts have generally required that a waiver be a knowing
one-that the person waiving a right know of its existence and appreciate the
consequences of its relinquishment. The standard for determining a knowing
waiver, however, is multiple and varies with the right involved.
C. The Requirement of Voluntariness
Even though a person might have knowledge of his rights, his relinquish-
ment of them may not be the result of a free choice; waiver maybe an involuntary
act and as such would not be valid. The primary purpose of any inquiry into
the voluntariness of a waiver of rights is to determine whether the relinquishment
can reasonably be said to be the result of the actor's free will, or the product of
"actual or threatened physical harm . . . or mental coercion overbearing the
will of the defendent.""
The most extensive judicial treatment of the meaning of voluntariness can be
found in cases dealing with allegedly coerced confessions. Prior to the decision of
Escobedo v. IllinoisO5 the Court was always willing to tolerate some pressure, with
the inquiry being "how much pressure on the suspect was permissible."' 6 The
ultimate test for voluntariness had traditionally been the "totality of the circum-
stances," a flexible standard designed "to respond to the endless mutations of
fact presented.... The many factors considered in such an evaluation have
38 Perhaps the Court recognized that if a suspect is willing to give up these key rights,
one can infer a willingness to give up other less important ones without full understanding.
See Note, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal After Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUm. L. REV.
130, 153 (1967).
39 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 771 (1970); see also Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970). The role of counsel
is most fully analyzed in McMann.
40 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. at 771.
41 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 756.
42 Given the wide range of competence found in attorneys in criminal cases, the correlative
depth of knowledge now symbolically required could range from relative ignorance to full
understanding.
43 See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
44 Brady v. United States. 397 U.S. at 750.
45 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
46 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 507 (1966), (Harlan, J., dissenting).
47 Id. at 508.
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ranged from threats,48 physical deprivation,"9 and extended interrogation 0 to lack
of education,5 ' low intelligence,52 and failure to advise the accused of his rights.5"
Although no one factor was ever deemed controlling,5 4 some were given more
weight than others depending on the facts of the case.
Recently, the Supreme Court has begun to recognize voluntariness as part of
the test for a valid waiver. Although the Court has periodically used the concept
in other areas,55 it has treated the concept of voluntariness most fully in the
guilty plea cases. Beginning with McCarthy v. United States," it recognized
that a plea must be "equally voluntary and knowing. ' 57 The Court continued to
intermingle the concepts58 until, in Brady v. United States," it created a new
analytical framework. Separate analysis was given both the voluntary and the
knowledgeable nature of the waiver of the various rights accomplished by a guilty
plea.6" Although this dual test originated in the context of a challenge to the
validity of a plea of guilty, its use by the Court in Schneckloth would appear to
indicate that it is a viable test in other circumstances.
III. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte:
Waiver at the Threshold?
While the Brady bifurcation of voluntariness and knowing waiver did not
result in the creation of meaningful indicia of how knowledge or voluntariness
is to be determined, it did create a broad analytical framework that would make
it possible for the Court to categorically reject application of waiver standards to
a constitutional right for the first time since the development of the Johnson v.
Zerbst definitional formula. In the case of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte8" the Court
concluded that the validity of consent searches should be determined only by
looking at the voluntary nature of the consent even though a consent search was
the only method whereby an individual could relinquish his fourth amendment
protections. The Court found that knowledge of the right waived and apprecia-
tion of the consequences of the waiver were important only to the extent that they
had a bearing on the voluntariness of the consent, and even then not as pre-
requisites but only as possible elements to consider in the totality of the circum-
stances.
48 E.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
49 E.g., Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
50 E.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
51 E.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
52 E.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
53 E.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966).
54 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
55 See notes 27 and 28 .supra.
56 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
57 Id. at 466.
58 The Court stated that a guilty plea "cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant
possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts." Id.
59 397 U.S. 74-2 (1970).
60 See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
61 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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A. Nature of the Fourth Amendment Right
The fourth amendment has long been recognized as creating fundamental
rights 2 designed to protect the privacy of individuals. 63 By its terms, however,
it does not confer absolute protection on the citizenry. Rather, it protects against
"unreasonable searches and seizures" and provides that "no warrant shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."64 It
is not readily apparent if the reasonableness clause is to be read in conjunction
with the warrant clause or if each is to be considered as having an independent
bearing on the particular search and seizure under consideration. Determination
of this question has divided the Court for years and is still the source of an on-
going dispute.6" Whichever standard dominates in a given case may affect the
degree of restrictiveness with which the Court will view a warrantless search and
seizure.
Nevertheless, the Court has recognized a myriad of exceptions to the fourth
amendment protections. Despite the admonition of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
that the "exceptions cannot be enthroned into the rule,66 the tendency has been
to allow warrantless searches and seizures when "the exigencies of the situation
[make] that course imperative."6 " In so doing, the Court has created a rather con-
fusing set of standards. Indeed, the state of the law is such as to compel Mr.
Justice Rehnquist to recently make the tongue-in-cheek comment that "this
branch of the law is something less than a seamless web."6 Although an analysis
of all these exceptions is beyond the scope of this note,6" it is sufficient for our
purposes to indicate that they range from the virtually unrestricted border
search"0 to the more limited "stop and frisk" confrontation." An increasingly
62 E.g., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
63 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
64 U.S. Const. amend. IV.
65 For example, in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973), the Court based
its decision on its finding that "the ultimate standard ... is reasonableness." However, in the
previous term the Court had emphasized that the "warrant clause . . .is not dead language,"
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 '(1972), and stated that
under a pure reasonableness test, fourth amendment protections "would approach the evapora-
tion point." Id., at 315 n.16, quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969). For
analysis of the philosophical debate, see Player, Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 5 Ga. L.
Rev. 269 (1971).
66 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 80 '(1950), (Frankfurter, j.. dissenting).
67 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). The Court noted in Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971):
It is accepted, at least as a matter of principle, that a search or seizure carried out
on a suspect's premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the police
can show that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions based on the
presence of "exigent circumstances." As to other kinds of intrusions, however, there
has been disagreement about the basic rules to be applied, as our cases concerning
automobile searches, electronic surveillance, street searches and administrative
searches make clear.
68 Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973).
69 For an excellent analysis, see Landynski. The Supreme Court's Search For Fourth
Amendment Standards: The Warrantless Search, 45 CONN. B.J. 2 (1971).
70 E.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
71 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 '(1968).
[April 19741
significant exception 2 to the requirement is the search conducted pursuant to the
consent of the subject of the search or an appropriate third party.
B. The Nature of Consent
The consent search has traditionally been recognized as a standard in-
vestigatory technique of the police which, when properly obtained and conducted,
is not violative of the fourth amendment. A consent search may be requested by
a police officer for a variety of reasons: he may have probable cause to search but
wish to avoid the administrative inconvenience of getting a search warrant; he
may have reasonable suspicion, not amounting to probable cause, that evidence
of criminal activity would be discovered and consent would be the only legally
available vehicle for verifying the suspicion; or he may simply want to engage
in an otherwise illegal fishing expedition. Whatever the motive for requesting
permission to search, once validly granted, any tangible, non-testimonial proof of
criminal activity which is uncovered is admissible as evidence at trial.
The constitutional basis for allowing consent searches is somewhat murky.
One could argue that the amendment was designed to protect the individual from
searches which he would not agree to in the first place. It has also been sug-
gested that one may view a search conducted on the basis of consent as being
reasonable and thus vitiating the requirement of the amendment. 73 Alternatively,
one judicial scholar has argued that such searches are allowed "because we permit
our citizens to choose whether or not they wish to exercise their constitutional
rights."' 4 Whatever basis is used, it is nonetheless clear that consent is a "mecha-
nism by which substantive requirements, otherwise applicable, are avoided.
'75
The Court has addressed itself to the problems presented in consent searches
at various times and from various perspectives. Although it has generally equated
consent with waiver,r it has done so almost cavalierly. Cases were resolved by
looking to see if the consent had been "freely and voluntarily given,"77 empha-
sizing that where coercion is present "there cannot be consent."7 " It has also
recognized that mere "acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority" would not
validate a search. 9
Additionally, the Court has concerned itself with who can consent. In doing
so, it has recognized a type of vicarious power to consent, or consent by third
parties. Such searches are based on a variety of theories, the most important
72 In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the Court urged those attempting
to conduct administrative searches to try to gain entrance by consent before resorting to the
fourth amendment's warrant process. Id. at 539-40.
73 Note, Consent Search: Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights, 12 St. L. U. L.J. 297,
298 (1968).
74 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 283 (1973), (Marshall. J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 282.
76 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 489 (1964) ; Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946);
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
77 Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 '(1968).
78 Id. at 550.
79 Id. at 549-50. In Bumper the petitioner's grandmother had submitted to a search in
response to the claim of a policeman that he had a valid search warrant. The search warrant
was never produced at trial.
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being an implied agency or assumption of the risk theory"0 and the recognition of
a property interest.8" The Court has somewhat hedged this latter theory by hold-
ing that the owner of a hotel, or his employee, may not consent to the search of
a guest's room, 2 nor may a landlord authorize a search of his tenant's quarters."
Prior to the decision in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,4 however, the Court
had never squarely faced the question of what constituted a valid consent. Ever
since Miranda v. Arizona s there had been considerable agitation in the academic
community for creating a fourth amendment warning requirement," or some
other method 7 for proving that an individual had consented to a search with the
knowledge that he had a constitutional right to refuse. Several lower federal
courts had accepted this position and required that the prosecution must prove
that a defendant knowingly consented to the search before its fruits would be
admissible in evidence.88 When the Court finally dealt with the issue, it firmly
rejected all suggestions based on a Miranda analogy and dealt with the problem
of waiver analysis in a manner which left fundamental questions unresolved.
C. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Analysis, Criticism, and Projection
1. The Voluntary Waiver
The Court defined the issue in Schneckloth as being "what must the prosecu-
tion prove to demonstrate that a consent was 'voluntarily' given,"8 and confined
itself to situations where the subject of a search is not in custody. In analyzing
the requirement of voluntariness, the Court relied heavily on pre-Miranda
coerced confession cases.
At the outset, the Court recognized that a confession was traditionally
voluntary if it was "the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice
80 Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969); see also Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427 (1963), and Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
81 For an excellent discussion, see Duffle, Some Observations on the Supreme Court's
Use of Property Concepts in Resolving Fourth Amendment Problems, 21 CATH. U. L. R.v.
1 (1971).
82 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
83 Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
84 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
85 384 U.S. 436 "(1966).
86 The following warning was proposed in Note, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal After
Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. Rav. 130, 158 (1967):
You have a right to refuse to allow me to search your home, and if you decide
to refuse, I will respect your refusal. If you do decide to let me search, you won't
be able to change your mind later on, and during the search I'll be able to look in
places and take things which I couldn't even if I could get a search warrant. You
have a right to a lawyer before you decide, and if you can't afford a lawyer we will
get you one and you won't have to pay for him. There are many different laws
which are designed to protect you from my searching, but they are too complicated
for me to explain or for you to understand, so if you think you would like to take
advantage of this very important information, you will need a lawyer to help you
before you tell me I can search.
87 Note, Consent Search: Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights, 12 St. L. U. L.J. 297,
307 (1968) suggests that the police might carry a tape recorder with them which could
simultaneously give a potential subject of a search a warning and record his response.
88 See note 7 supra.
89 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973).
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by its maker.""ra It stated, however, that this "cannot be taken literally to mean a
'knowing' choice,"" and held that the same was true for the consent search area.
With regard to the specific test for voluntariness in the area of consent searches
the Court said:
[When the subject of the search is not in custody and the State attempts
to justify the search on the basis of consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact
voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or
implied. Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the
circumstances. 92
The Court also indicated that the subject's knowledge of the right to permit a
search could be considered in determining voluntariness, but was not a pre-
requisite to establishing uncoerced consent.9" In the consent search situation,
therefore, the traditional requirements that a valid waiver be knowing and
intelligent were merged into the concept of voluntariness.
2. Trial and Non-Trial Rights
As has already been indicated earlier in this note, the Court categorically
refused to extend the Johnson v. Zerbst formula to the consent search situation.
To do otherwise, the Court reasoned, would be to "generalize from the broad
rhetoric of some of our decisions, and to ignore the substance of the different
constitutional guarantees."9 4 Indeed, the Court even refused to indulge "every
reasonable presumption... [against] voluntary relinquishment" since the public
should be encouraged to consent to a search, that is, to give up their fourth
amendment guarantees.95 The Court argued that the very nature of the fourth
amendment protection distinguished it from the rights which had been accorded
the standards of Johnson. Those rights, the Court emphasized, are designed "to
preserve a fair trial,"98 while the rights enshrined in the fourth amendment are
not: evidence seized in violation of the rights is nonetheless reliable. Ignoring
the conceptual confusion endemic to past waiver cases, the Court confidently
stated:
A strict standard of waiver has been applied to those rights guaranteed
to a criminal defendant to insure that he will be accorded the greatest pos-
sible opportunity to utilize every facet of the constitutional model of a fair
90 412 U.S. at 225, quoting Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
91 412 U.S. at 224.
92 Id. at 248-49.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 246. The language is very similar to that of Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 511 (1966). In fact, the Court in Schneckloth appears
to borrow heavily from both the language and analytical framework used in Mr. Justice
Harlan's dissent.
95 412 U.S. at 243. The policy rationale for such a call to relinquish a constitutional pro-
tection was that "the resulting search may yield necessary evidence for the solution and pros-
ecution of crime, evidence that may insure that a wholly innocent person is not wrongly
charged with a criminal offense." Id.
96 Id. at 237.
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criminal trial. Any trial conducted in derogation of that model leaves open
the possibility that the trial reached an unfair result precisely because all the
protections specified in the Constitution were not provided.
97
In thus deriving guidance from the facts of past waiver cases, the Court noted
that such rights were either basic trial rights, rights applicable to "trial-type situ-
ations," or those applicable to "certain stages before the actual trial... [which]
protect the fairness of the trial itself.""8 Therefore, because the Court could
not find precedent for the application of the strict standard of knowing waiver
to the non-custodial investigative process, it refused to apply it. This logic over-
looks the fact that Schneckloth was the first case in which the Court faced the
issue.
3. The Conceptual Problems
The fact that the Court refused to apply the standard of knowing waiver in
consent searches is of less importance than why it refused. One would hope that
an analysis of the Court's reasoning would provide some insight into the nature
of waiver rather than its form. Unfortunately that is not the case.
The Court argues that "there is nothing in the purposes or application of the
waiver requirements of Johnson v. Zerbst that justifies, much less compels, the
equation of a knowing waiver with a consent search."9 9 As already indicated, the
now announced purpose is to protect the fairness of a criminal trial. It is
significant, however, that the Court spent precious little space in analyzing the
purposes and precedents of the fourth amendment. Not a word is devoted to the
fundamental nature of the rights protected by it despite ample precedent for the
proposition. If one were to consider the context of past waiver cases, it would
appear that the purpose of the Johnson standards is to protect fundamental
rights. Apparently the Court has now decided that this was mere rhetoric. But
what is it that makes the fourth amendment protections less fundamental than
others? The Court states that a search cannot be "somehow 'unfair' if a person
consents" to it.' Yet what essentially is it that makes an uninformed waiver of
a fourth amendment right fair, while the uninformed waiver of a trial right is
unfair? Both must be voluntary, but one requires the additional element of
knowledge. Moreover, is the constitutional model of a fair criminal trial less
endangered by unwitting renunciation of a fundamental constitutional right than
by the exclusion of illegally seized evidence? In terms of the purposes served in
incorporating rights in a written constitution, what significant qualitative differ-
ence exists? It is difficult to imagine the constitutional model of a criminal trial
remaining untarnished in a case such as Schneckloth when the conviction is for
possessiorn of something and the item was seized following an unintelligent and
97 Id. at 241.
98 Id. at 238-39. The Court characterized its prior waiver decisions differently in the case
of Barker v. Win go. There the Court said that previous decisions had involved "rights which
must be exercised or waived at a specific time or under clearly identifiable circumstances."
407 U.S. at 529.
99 Id. at 246 (emphasis added).
100 Id. at 242.
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unknowing waiver of substantive constitutional requirements. The fact of posses-
sion guarantees conviction once requisite intent is established. It now appears
that the prosecution can have its cake and eat it too without tainting the consti-
tutional model.'
The key to an understanding of the Court's waiver analysis is to appreciate
what it perceives as the utter impossibility of applying the strict standard in the
consent context. The decision conveys the distinct impression that the Court is
bound and determined to protect consent searches from rigorous constitutional
scrutiny.' 2 The straw-man logic of the opinion is intriguing. The Court assumes
that Johnson v. Zerbst necessarily demands a thorough examination "designed
for a trial judge in the structured atmosphere of a courtroom."'03 Once this
postulate is established, the Court goes on to note:
It would be unrealistic to expect that in the informal, unstructured context
of a consent search, a policeman, upon pain of tainting the evidence
obtained, could make the detailed type of examination demanded by John-
son. And, if for this reason a diluted form of "waiver" were found ac-
ceptable, that would itself be ample recognition of the fact that there is no
universal standard that must be applied in every situation where a person
forgoes a constitutional right.'0
The inherent benefit of such analysis is that once one assumes the need for such
a diluted examination, common sense would demand rejection. The problem is
that such analysis overlooks the less demanding role assigned to competent
counsel by the Brady trilogy and, more importantly, avoids the implications of
Miranda. As has already been noted, once the Miranda warnings have been
given, a suspect may then waive his rights without any exacting examination by
the police. Thus, the Court assumes the extremes of the required examination and
the degree of knowledge, something which has been previously required only in
the context of a guilty plea, and consequently selectively eliminates consent
searches from scrutiny under the standard of Johnson.
It should be noted at this point that the Court implicitly recognized that a
waiver had been made by Mr. Bustamonte.05 It appears the Court assumed,
however, that its validation does not require the application of the strict standard
of Johnson: that is, it need not be knowing and intelligent. While the Court
101 Since a strict fourth amendment waiver standard would operate functionally as an
exclusionary rule, one may view this as an attempt on the part of the Court to limit the rule.
That this is the expressed desire of some of the members of the Court is clear. See Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),
(Burger, C. J., dissenting).
102 Mr. Justice Marshall uses much stronger language:
It is regrettable that the obsession with validating searches like that conducted in
this case, so evident in the Court's hyperbole, has obscured the Court's vision of how
the Fourth Amendment was designed to govern the relationship between police and
citizen in our society.
412 U.S. at 290 '(Marshall, J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 244.
104 Id. at 245.
105 Mr. Justice Marshall suggests that such a "strained argument ... is fundamentally




limits that requirement to rights relating to the fairness of a trial, it gives no
further indication as to what validates an unknowing waiver. Given the Court's
heavy reliance on the standard of voluntariness, however, it must be assumed
that this new type of waiver is somehow merged with the lower standard of
voluntary renunciation. Thus, the concepts become coextensive and we are left
with two standards of waiver: voluntary waiver and knowing and intelligent
waiver.
4. In-Custody Consent as Waiver
Despite the conclusions reached by its analysis of purpose and application
of waiver standards, the Court suggests that if the consent were given by a
person in custody the considerations would be different."' 8 Analogizing to
Miranda, the Court justifies this suggestion by noting the "heightened possibilities
for coercion when the 'consent' to a search was given by a person in custody.
' 10 7
Such a suggestion presents some serious conceptual problems."'O
Given the increased aura of coercion present, one would suspect that at least
a Miranda-type warning would be required to dispel the coercion. Indeed, one
court has suggested that the Miranda warnings are themselves sufficient since
fourth amendment warnings are implicit in the warning of the right to remain
silent.'" If the suspect invokes his rights and demands an attorney, then one
can assume, based on prior Court decisions, that any future waiver will be
knowing and intelligent if the attorney is reasonably competent. If, however,
the subject waives his right to counsel and his right to remain silent, can we
necessarily infer that a later consented-to search would be a knowing and intel-
ligent choice? Arguably, Miranda stands for the proposition that waiver of the
rights contained in the warnings may signal waiver of other supplementary
rights."1 But as the Court indicated in Schneckloth, fourth amendment rights
are of a "wholly different order"""'; and, therefore, one would hope that a
specific fourth amendment warning would be required. Admittedly, a detailed
examination of the nature conducted by a judge in a criminal trial could not be
administered, but it need not be administered in the strict Miranda context
either. Additionally, the policy considerations influencing the Schneckloth ap-
proach in non-custodial situations would not be determinative in a custodial
context. A fourth amendment warning would not unnecessarily interfere with
traditional police investigative functions; Miranda has already interrupted the
process at that stage. Moreover, the likelihood of the police having probable
cause to obtain a search warrant is greater at this stage, and if the Court will
not go so far as to demand that they adhere to the requisite judicial process, it
106 Id. at 240-41 n.29. It is important, conceptually, to emphasize that this was suggested
in the midst of the Court's waiver analysis.
107 Id.
108 C. MCCORMIcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EvDENcm § 175, at 404 (2d ed. 1972).
109 Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158 (lst Cir. 1967).
110 See Note, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal After Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM.
L. REv. 130, 153 (1967).
111 412 U.S. at 242.
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should at least be more exacting in its demands for a valid consent. Strict waiver
standards would seem appropriate.
Nevertheless, it is still difficult to understand why the stage of the process
should affect the consideration of the right involved here. Unlike the right to
counsel, which attaches at specific stages of the process as Kirby v. Illinois"2
makes dear, the fourth amendment protections surround the individual at all
stages of his existence, subject of course to the carefully defined exceptions.
If, however, the Court's suggestion is viewed in the context of traditional
fourteenth amendment voluntariness standards, the proposition makes more
sense. Voluntariness analysis has historically tolerated some coercion, and the
stage of the prosecutorial process could well affect the degree of coercion which
the Court is willing to accept in any given case. Since custodial interrogation is
inherently coercive under the Miranda rationale, something more than a totality
of the circumstances test is needed to dispel the taint which any confession or
consent to search would have. Knowledge of the right to refuse consent could
well indicate that a suspect's will was not overborne and could serve as a
significant factor in a more refined totality test. 13 This could be accomplished
by a variety of methods: a warning would be one, and surely the most objective
method. However, the Court would not necessarily have to confine itself to it.
As Mr. Justice Marshall suggested in his Schneckloth dissent, other less certain,
yet acceptable, methods exist." 4 Statements made by the suspect at the time the
search took place, as well as past refusals by the suspect to allow a search could
indicate knowledge. Indeed, even the "prior experience or training of the subject
might in some cases support an inference that he knew of his right to exclude the
police.""' In third party consent searches where one has standing to challenge,
as in Schneckloth, the prosecutor could call the third party to testify under oath.
Of course, if this latter course were chosen, the third party could well invoke his
privilege against self-incrimination and thereby create the tactical quagmire
analogous to that presented in Barker v. Wingo."16 Nevertheless, warnings would
be the preferable method, and the question would again become: is a specific
fourth amendment warning necessary? Here again, the considerations would be
basically those described above.
VI. Conclusion
The history of knowing waiver, born in conceptual contradiction, has been
a rather tortured and twisting attempt at accommodating the literal meaning of
the requirement with the asserted policy needs of differing constitutional rights.
112 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
113 Cf. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740 (1966), '(failure to warn a suspect
of his rights is a "significant factor in considering the voluntariness" of a confession where trial
held prior to Escobedo and Miranda).
114 412 U.S. at 286.
115 Id.
116 407 U.S. 514 (1972). In Barker the prosecution sought and received sixteen con-
tinuances over a period of nearly five years. The strategy was to remove any problem of self-
incrimination which might be faced by the accused's accomplice, who then could be called to




The notion that waiver was designed as an independent substantive requirement
giving added support to individual freedoms has become largely meaningless
illusion. The concept has changed its meaning with virtually each application;
it has become a barometer of the changing philosophical tendencies of the Court
and has on many occasions been treated as though it were excess baggage.
Structurally, the Court at this time views the renunciation of constitutional
rights in the following manner: Is the right waived a fundamental one? If so, is
the suspect's act voluntary, that is, is it the product of a not-too-coerced will?
Does the right pertain to guaranteeing the fairness of a criminal trial? If so, did
the suspect know that he had a constitutional right not to give up the protection;
and, depending on the right, did he understand the legal consequences of his
act? In determining whether additional rights will be brought within the pro-
tective umbrella of waiver, the Court will look to the purposes and application of
the knowing waiver formula to divine the appropriateness of inclusion. Practi-
cally speaking, this means that the Court will determine if effective law enforce-
ment will be served by demanding a knowledgeable and intelligent waiver; if
not, then only voluntary waiver is necessary.
With the decision in Schneckloth v. Burtamonte the concept has become
an overinflated word of art. There, the Court apparently followed the admoni-
tion of Mr. Justice Harlan in his Miranda dissent and refused to "carry over...
engaging rhetoric and to obscure the policy choices to be made in regulating""1
consent searches. By doing so, it was unwilling to meet the challenge given by
Mr. Justice Goldberg when he noted in Escobedo v. Illinois:
[N]o system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend
for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through unaware-
ness of their constitutional rights.... If the exercise of constitutional rights
will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is
something very wrong with that system. 18
Eugene E. Smary
117 384 U.S. 436, 511 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
118 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
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